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NOTE
ADAPTING INTEGER PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES TO
CIRCUIT RESTRUCTURING
David Carlsont
During the second half of the twentieth century, rapidly increasing fed-
eral caseloads sparked recurring debates about the geographic boundaries of
the United States Courts of Appeals. Several studies, including a 1998 final
report from the congressionally chartered Commission on Structural Alterna-
tives for the federal Courts of Appeals, considered altering or splitting circuits
to alleviate caseload congestion. Although the literature discusses criteria for
ideal circuits, the resulting proposals have remained highly theoretical, geo-
graphically limited, or both.
In this Note, I apply mathematical programming techniques to con-
struct a complete set of hypothetical circuit courts by using generally accepted
criteria for an ideal circuit. I then consider how suggested relaxations of
those ideal rules might alter the circuits' geographic arrangement.
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INTRODUCTION
For as long as the United States Courts of Appeals have been part
of the federal judicial system, commentators, judges, and policymak-
ers have disagreed over their geographic boundaries.' Indeed, these
disagreements began even before Congress finalized the Evarts Act,2
which initially created the courts.3 These disagreements are closely
intertwined with discussions about the courts' core characteristics,
such as how many states they encompass, the workload of theirjudges,
the number of judges on each court's bench, and whether a circuit
may contain only part of a state.4 The debates simmered through the
early twentieth century and boiled over in the latter half of that cen-
tury5 when the federal docket expanded rapidly, prompting at least a
dozen major studies and a rush of proposed solutions.6
As commentators struggled with these issues, their analyses were
either highly theoretical, limited to a geographically compact subset
of the country, or both.7 Simultaneously juggling every circuit's
boundaries is a daunting task. However, grasping the implications of
each proposal for large-scale structural reform is difficult without de-
1 See, e.g., COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE Sys., THE GEOGRAPHI-
CAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCurrs. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 3-5
(1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 229-30 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA REPORT] (recom-
mending splitting the Fifth and Ninth Circuits); COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE
FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, at ix-x (1998) [hereinafter WHITE REPORT] (rec-
ommending against splitting the Ninth Circuit).
2 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
3 SeeJohn M. Roll, The 115 Year-Old Ninth Circuit-Why a Split Is Necessary and Inevita-
ble, 7 Wyo. L. REv. 109, 112 (2007) (discussing the argument that California should be in a
separate circuit from the Pacific Northwest, which SenatorJoseph N. Dolph (R-OR) raised
during debate on the Evarts Act in 1890).
4 See, e.g., WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-xi (outlining key aspects of the debate
on splitting the Ninth Circuit).
5 See Roll, supra note 3, at 111-14 (providing a brief history of the debate on whether
to split the Ninth Circuit).
6 See generally Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of
Appeals: A Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 395 (2000) (summarizing each study and its
recommendations).
7 See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
MITrEE 116-24 (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733, 856-64 (1990) [hereinafter WEIS
REPORT] (examining several ideas for systemic structural reform at a highly theoretical
level); WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-57, 59-60 (discussing several specific proposals
to reform the Ninth Circuit and theoretical proposals for structural reform of the entire
federal appellate system); see also Baker, supra note 6.
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pictions of how the circuits would look if the proposals were followed.
Fortunately, computers now permit such depictions.
In this Note, I apply a mathematical programming technique
called integer programming to create different models of the United
States Courts of Appeals based on the most commonly accepted crite-
ria for ideal circuit courts. I then consider the effects of proposed
relaxations of these established criteria.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Current Situation
1. Structuring the Federal Courts
The modem United States Courts of Appeals originated with the
Evarts Act of 1891.8 Congress passed the Act, which dramatically re-
shaped the contours of the federal courts, to address the burgeoning
caseload of the federal judicial system.9 In the decades preceding the
Act, increases in the country's size, economic base, and population, as
well as a significant expansion of federal jurisdiction, led to a massive
increase in the federal docket.10 For political reasons, Congress failed
to address the problem until the federal appellate process almost com-
pletely broke down." Fortunately, the reforms worked, and caseloads
became manageable again. 12
Since the passage of the Evarts Act, the federal courts have exper-
ienced significant changes. These changes have been incremental
and functional rather than revolutionary,13 but Congress did make
some structural changes to the federal courts as a result of this evolu-
tion. In 1911, Congress merged the old, redundant circuit courts into
the district courts.14 Over the next seventy years, Congress created
four additional courts of appeals: three regional courts and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction is based on sub-
ject matter.15 Additionally, procedural and administrative changes
implemented during the past few decades have radically altered the
appellate experience.' 6
8 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
9 See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL. THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 9 (1994).
10 See id. at 7.
11 See id. at 7-9; WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8, 10-11.
12 See BAKER, supra note 9, at 10.
13 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
14 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087.
15 See infta Part IB; see also WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
16 See Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the "Crisis of Volume,"8 J. App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 111-12 (2006).
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2. The Problem
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the caseload of the
federal appellate courts dramatically increased again. Furthermore,
factors strikingly similar to those that drove the courts to disaster in
the latter half of the nineteenth century caused this increase: eco-
nomic development, increasing population, and an increase in federal
jurisdiction.17 Furthermore, caseload increases disproportionately
burdened courts in the southern and western United States.18 Al-
though Congress authorized additional appellate judgeships during
this time, those increases did not keep pace with the number of
appeals. 19
B. Past Attempts to Deal with the Problem
The debate over how to address the increase in appellate court
workload is long running and energetic. A great deal of the discus-
sion of these issues has focused on how to deal with the problems
facing specific circuit courts. The debate surrounding the decision to
split the former Fifth Circuit into the current Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits was considerable.20 In addition, the debate over how to alter the
Ninth Circuit has always been lively.21 Even as the specific focus of the
debate wanders, it retains several common themes, which I consider
below.22
1. An Introduction to Past Studies
Over the past fifty years, thirteen prominent studies have consid-
ered how to solve the federal appellate courts' caseload problem. 23
17 Compare Scott Bales, The Ninth Circuit: Should It Stay or Should It Go?, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 379, 387 (2000) (elaborating that rapid population and economic growth in the
Southwest helped fuel the caseload crisis facing the Ninth Circuit), and WEIs REPORT, supra
note 7, at 4-5, reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733, 744, with BAKER, supra note 9, at 7.
18 See Bales, supra note 17, at 386-88 (noting population growth in the Southwest).
19 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
20 See BAKER, supra note 9, at 52-68; Crystal Marchesoni, Comment, "United We Stand,
Divided We Fall"?: The Controversy Surrounding a Possible Division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 37 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1263, 1269-71 (2005).
21 See Symposium, Managing the Federal Courts; Will the Ninth Circuit Be a Model for
Change?, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 315 (2000) (discussing the significance and wisdom of the
White Commission's report); see also WEIs REPORT, supra note 7, at 123, reprinted in 22
CONN. L. REv. 733, 863 (not taking a position on whether to split the Ninth Circuit); WHITE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-47 (arguing for a divisional model that would split the Ninth
Circuit into small units but preserve the Ninth Circuit as an administrative unit); Roll,
supra note 3, at 111 (arguing in favor of splitting the Ninth Circuit).
22 See generally Baker, supra note 6 (summarizing past studies).
23 See generally Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, § 302(c), 104 Stat. 5104, 5104 (1990) (chartering a study of circuit splits and
structural alternatives for the Courts of Appeals); AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE
WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALs (1968) (focusing specifically on the
caseload problem); AM. LAw INsr., STUDY OF THE DivisION OFJURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
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They include three congressionally chartered commissions: the
Hruska Commission in the 1970s, the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee in 1990, and the White Commission, which filed its Final Report in
1998.24
A few common trends appear in all thirteen studies.25 All of the
studies rely on highly competent experts from various disciplines.
Each study also concludes that the caseload crisis is real and that re-
form is necessary. All of the studies suggest that internal procedural
or administrative reforms could help solve the problem. However, the
1968 American Law Institute report was the last to support the pro-
position that adding judges alone could solve the caseload crisis.2 6
Despite their commonalities, the studies' recommendations dif-
fer, and Congress rarely implemented the recommendations. For ex-
ample, the Justice Department studies led to the creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,27 and Congress followed the
Hruska Commission's recommendation to split the former Fifth Cir-
cuit.28 However, policymakers ignored the recommendations of many
other commissions, and later studies would contradict those recom-
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) (presenting the results of the American Law Institute's (ALI)
eight-year study); COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE Sys. STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)
[hereinafter HRUSKA FINAL REPORT] (proposing various reform measures, including a Na-
tional Court of Appeals); DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. JUDICIAL SYS.,
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977) (making recommendations for reform of the
federal court system); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (presenting the Freund Commit-
tee's examination of various strategies of judicial system reform); HRUSKA REPORT, supra
note 1, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) (recommending splitting the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995) (analyzing proposed reform of several facets of the federal court system); SAMUEL
ESTREICHER &JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE (1986) (proposing a
managerial model for the Supreme Court and discussing the proposal for an Intercircuit
Tribunal that would sit below the Supreme Court and above the Courts of Appeals); WEIS
REPORT, supra note 7, reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733 (1990) (providing an assessment of
the federal court system and describing various proposals for reform); Baker, supra note 6,
at 396, 402 (highlighting the role of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice); Seth Huf-
stedler & Paul Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66
A.B.A. J. 965 (1980) (discussing the American Bar Association's Action Commission to
Reduce Court Costs and Delay); Daniel J. Meador, The Federaljudiciay-Inlation, Malfunc-
tion, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981 BYU L. REv. 617, 628 (discussing the overlooked
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice).
24 These studies are commonly known as the Hruska Commission, Weis Committee,
and White Commission. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973);
HRUSKA FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975); WEIS REPORT, supra
note 7, reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733 (1990); WHITE REPORT, supra note 1.
25 See generally Baker, supra note 6 (summarizing each study's recommendations and
identifying common themes).
26 See id. at 397-98; cf WrTE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 (describing reconfiguration
of the Ninth Circuit as a possible alternative to increasing the number of judgeships).
27 See Baker, supra note 6, at 404.
28 BAKER, supfa note 9, at 64-68.
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mendations. For example, Congress rejected the White Commission's
recommendation to split the Ninth Circuit into semiautonomous ad-
ministrative divisions.29 Furthermore, despite the findings of these
studies and the absence of any major studies after the White Commis-
sion, no real consensus exists regarding how to solve the problems
associated with the current structural framework.30
2. Generally Accepted Guidelines
The previous studies indicate several traditionally accepted rules
about what geographic criteria the circuit courts should meet:
1) Circuits in the continental United States should be geographi-
cally contiguous. 3 '
2) Regional circuit courts should encompass at least three states.32
3) No state should be split between two or more circuits.33
Although the studies do not unanimously agree upon these rules, 34
they tend to treat deviations from them as exceptions to the current
baseline.35
Greater debate exists over how many cases a court can effectively
manage. This question includes two separate issues: (1) whether ad-
ding too many judges to an appellate court reduces its effectiveness
and (2) how many cases each judge can reasonably manage.
The debate over the Ninth Circuit illustrates the first of these is-
sues. Some commentators believe the current number of judges on
the Ninth Circuit, twenty-eight, is appropriate. Other commentators
and the White Commission believe that it already has too many
29 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-xi; Roll, supra note 3, at 118-19 (summarizing
the White Commission's proposal platforms and Congress's subsequent rejection of them).
30 See generally Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins
and Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RicH. L. REv. 659
(2007) (using data analysis to look at decision-making norms of federal courts in finding a
solution to the judicial-caseload quandary); Roll, supra note 3 (advocating for a split in the
Ninth Circuit); Symposium, supra note 21 (discussing the significance and wisdom of the
White Commission report); Carl Tobias, An Update on the Ninth Circuit Debate, 3J. APP. PRAc.
& PROCEss 661 (2001) (providing a general overview of the complexities of various ap-
proaches and possible future outcomes).
31 See, e.g., HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 232 (1973).
32 See, e.g., WHrrE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53. But see HRUSKA REPORT, supra note
1, at 7, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. at 231-32 (arguing that two-state circuits might be acceptable
in some circumstances).
33 Cf WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 57 ("[W]e are persuaded that it is better to have
the State of California subject to different divisions within the same circuit than to split it
between circuits.").
34 See, e.g., HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-20, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. at 238-40
(discussing and rejecting several arguments against splitting California between two courts
of appeals).
35 See, e.g., id. at 16, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. at 238 ("The division of a state between two
circuits would be an innovation in the history of the federal judicial system.").
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judges.36 After polling the federal judiciary, the White Commission
concluded that "the maximum number of judges for an effective ap-
pellate court ... is somewhere between eleven and seventeen."37 Sev-
enty-four percent of the judges who responded to the Commission's
survey shared this opinion, while twenty-two percent of the judges be-
lieved that either the limit was higher or that circuit courts can oper-
ate effectively with an unlimited number of judges.38
For comparison, the judges of the former Fifth Circuit voted to
split when that circuit reached twenty-six judges.39 Indeed, one nota-
ble difference between the current Ninth Circuit and the former Fifth
Circuit is that the current Ninth Circuit judges still oppose a split,
while the Fifth Circuit judges eventually concluded that the split was
necessary. 40
Commentators also disagree over the appropriate caseload for a
federal circuit in both absolute terms and on a per judge or per panel
basis. Currently, the Judicial Conference of the United States uses a
measure called adjusted case filings to evaluate circuit court caseloads.'"
When computing this figure, the Judicial Conference ignores rein-
stated cases and discounts pro se cases by two-thirds. 42 When deciding
whether to recommend that Congress appoint new judges, the Con-
ference uses five hundred adjusted case filings per three-judge panel
per year as its baseline.43 It does not, however, rely solely on this mea-
sure; it also depends on subjective data including the circuit judges'
recommendation on whether to expand its bench. Unsurprisingly,
this procedure results in a wide range of caseload profiles across cir-
cuits. The Eleventh Circuit is a particularly interesting case. In their
36 WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at iii; see also Edward R. Becker, Contemplating the Future
of the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343, 343-44 (2000) ("I cannot imagine
judges in a circuit as large as the Ninth, with its staggering volume of opinions, being able
to do what the judges in [a smaller circuit] do to master circuit law."); Procter Hug, Jr.,
Potential Effects of the White Commission's Recommendations on the Operation of the Ninth Circuit,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 325 passim (2000) (arguing strongly against splitting or dividing the
Ninth Circuit). At the time these articles were written, the authors were the ChiefJudges
of the Third and Ninth Circuits, respectively.
37 WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
38 See id. at 29 n.72.
39 See BAKER, supra note 9, at 62-65; WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
40 Compare BAKER, supra note 9, at 62-65 (noting that the judges on the former Fifth
Circuit eventually agreed that a split was necessary), with WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at
37-39 (noting that a majority of polled Ninth Circuit judges opposed a split).
41 U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABILIrY OFFICE, GAO-09-1050T, FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS: THE GEN-
ERAL ACcuRACY OF DisrRcIr AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP CASE-RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES
7 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009].
42 See id. at 8.
43 See id. at 7; see also Arthur D. Hellman, AssessingJudgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCEss 239, 242-43 (2003)
(analyzing and critiquing the Judicial Conference's approach to determining whether to
recommend additional judgeships).
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quest to maintain the size of their bench, a majority of the judges
recommended against adding judges despite nearly seventy-five hun-
dred adjusted case filings for the circuit." This decision, however, has
come with tradeoffs.45
Adjusted case filings does not perfectly measure appellate court
workload: "Unlike the case weights used to measure district judge
case-related workload, adjusted case filings are not based on any em-
pirical data regarding the time that different types of cases required of
courts of appeals judges."46 The General Accounting Office (later the
Government Accountability Office) raised this issue in a 2003 report
and reiterated it in 2009.47 In both cases, the Office called on the
Judicial Conference to develop a more empirically grounded measure
of appellate caseload.48 Furthermore, even when a circuit's caseload
suggests that the Judicial Conference should recommend that Con-
gress add seats to the bench, the Conference consistently refuses to do
so unless a majority of the active judges in that circuit also vote for the
increase.49 Although the Judicial Conference has considered some al-
ternative caseload measures, it has not yet been able to agree on a
replacement for the problematic adjusted-case-filings formula.50
3. Suggestions for Reforms
The suggestions for reform fall into two general categories: func-
tional and structural. The functional reforms are a grab bag of ad-
ministrative and procedural reforms intended to allow appellate
judges to work more efficiently. They include increasing the role of
law clerks and support staff, aggressively screening and tracking ap-
peals, reducing the number of oral arguments, and reducing the
number of formal opinions.5 1 Not only do these reforms increase the
number of cases that each judge could resolve, but they also com-
pletely reshape the appellate process.52
44 See Hellman, supra note 43, at 253-54.
45 But see id. at 253-58 (highlighting possible problems caused by the large caseloads
of both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits).
46 GAO 2009, supra note 41, at 4, 7.
47 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, GAO-03-788R, FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS: THE GEN-
ERAL ACCURACY OF THE CASE-RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES USED TO ASSESS THE NEED FOR
ADDITIONAL DisRIucT COURT AND COURTS OF APPEALS JUDGESHIPS 3 (2003) [hereinafter
GAO 2003]; GAO 2009, supra note 41, at 4, 7, 10.
48 See GAO 2003, supra note 47, at 12; GAO 2009, supra note 41, at 7, 10.
49 See Hellman, supra note 43, at 254-58.
50 See GAO 2009, supra note 41, at 4.
51 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-25.
52 Commentators' views on this result differ greatly. Some condemn the result as an
abandonment of the basic principles of appellate justice. See BAKER, Supra note 9, at 48-50,
106-07 (discussing procedural, administrative, and "intramural" appellate reforms in re-
sponse to the "crisis of volume"). Others accept it as the cost of justice in the modern
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Additionally, commentators have proposed several major struc-
tural reforms. Many of these reforms are highly theoretical, particu-
larly those that propose changing the entire court of appeals system at
once.53 Other reforms are highly specific, recommending changes
that address a particular geographical subset of the country-typically,
the Ninth Circuit.54 The studies do not, however, offer specific de-
scriptions of the dimensions of the circuit courts under the proposed
systemic reforms.
C. A Brief Introduction to Integer Programming
Integer programming is one of many mathematic techniques for
optimally allocating scarce resources.55 It is particularly useful be-
cause of its flexibility.56 Technically speaking, an integer program
maximizes (or minimizes) a linear objective function subject to one or
more linear constraints. In addition, one or more variables in the in-
teger program may not assume noninteger values.5 7 This definition
undoubtedly makes as little sense to most lawyers as constitutional law
does to most mathematicians. Fortunately, it can be broken down
into more easily understood terms.
Integer programs contain four key elements: data, variables, con-
straints, and an objective function. Data are simply numbers that the
program may not change. Variables, on the other hand, are symbols
whose values the program may change. Constraints are rules that the
program must follow in determining what values to assign to each vari-
world. See Baker, supra note 16, at 113-14. However, while the functional reforms are
quite interesting, further discussion of them is beyond the scope of this Note.
53 See, e.g., WEIs REPORT, supra note 7, at 116-24, reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REV. 733,
856-65 (1990) (discussing systematic reforms for the entire federal appeals system in theo-
retical terms).
54 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 9, at 59-60 (discussing proposals for structural reform of
the Fifth Circuit); WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-57 (discussing several specific propos-
als to reform the Ninth Circuit).
55 For a more complete introduction to linear programming, see VASEK CHVATAL, LIN-
EAR PROGRAMMING 5-7 (1983).
56 See generally ROBERT FOURER ET AL., AMPL: A MODELING LANGUAGE FOR MATHEMATI-
CAL PROGRAMMING 403, 437-38 (2d ed. 2003) (comparing nonlinear programming to lin-
ear programming and discussing the particular benefits of integer programming as
compared to linear programming).
57 This final characteristic differentiates integer programs from the broader category
of linear programs. See id. A simple example demonstrates the significance of this feature.
Suppose an airline wants to use an integer program to assign planes to its routes. On a
particular day, the airline has one unassigned plane and two destinations. The airline
obviously cannot send half of the plane to Pittsburgh and the other half of the same plane
to New York City. A linear program that is not an integer program, however, might suggest
this impractical solution. An integer program would allow the airline to avoid the problem
by assigning the complete plane to either destination. See id. Of course, linear program-
ming might be able to solve this problem; some linear programs naturally assign values of 0
or I to their variables. This ideal situation, however, only arises in a small subset of the
field called network linear programming. See CHVATAL, supra note 55, at 326-27.
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able. A program's objective function defines its ultimate goal, fre-
quently by assigning rewards and penalties to different outcomes or
approaches.58 Finally, the constraints and objective function must all
be linear; although variables may be multiplied by nonvariables, no
variable may be multiplied by itself or another variable, and the con-
straints must take the form of mathematical equalities or
inequalities.5 9
For example, imagine a program to allocate emergency-response
vehicles to base stations in a community. The user would enter data
such as emergency call rates and travel times. Variables would re-
present the number of vehicles assigned to each possible site. In com-
puting results, the program would work under constraints
representing defined minimum response times. The objective func-
tion could then minimize average response time while applying a pen-
alty for each extra vehicle added to the system.60
II
MODELING STRUCTuRAL REFORM
A. Introduction
To study possible structural reform of the federal appellate courts
using integer programming, I wrote computer models using commer-
cial modeling software and ran the models on a desktop computer. 61
I started by modeling the generally accepted rules regarding circuit
court assignments. On subsequent models, I relaxed requirements.
The first model uses several constraints:
1) Circuits in the continental United States must be geographically
contiguous.
2) No single state may be split between two or more circuits.
3) Regional circuits must contain at least three states.
4) Each circuit must have enough judges to insure that adjusted
case filings per three-judge panel do not exceed five hundred.
5) Each circuit should seat between seven and seventeen judges.6 2
58 See generally CHVATAL, supra note 55, at 5-7 (introducing linear programming).
59 Although this linearity requirement may appear overly restrictive, models that fol-
low it may be solved much more quickly and easily than those that do not. See generally
FOURER ET AL., supra note 56, at 129-34, 391, 410, 437-38 (discussing the comparison be-
tween linear programming and nonlinear programming).
60 See generally Luce Brotcorne et al., Ambulance Location and Relocation Models, 147
EUR. J. OPERATIONAL REs. 451 (2003) (reviewing several ambulance location problems).
61 1 wrote the model in AMPL 10.1, a programming language developed by Bell Labo-
ratories for mathematical modeling. I solved the models using AMPL's implementation of
ILOG's CPLEX solver, a computer program designed to solve a variety of optimization
problems. I ran each model on a 2.40 GHz desktop computer with 2 GB of RAM.
62 Taken together, the limits in Rules 4 and 5 enforce a caseload limit of 2,833 ad-
justed case filings per circuit. Each circuit can contain at most 17 + 3 = 5 2/s three-judge
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6) Where possible, states and districts should remain in their cur-
rent circuit.63
Rules 1-5 are the baseline rules and possible alternatives that the
White and Hruska Commissions presented.6 4 Rule 6 is a common
sense rule that the Hruska Commission considered. 65 I structured
Rules 1-5 as absolute commands and Rule 6 as a weight in the objec-
tive function. In situations where the Rules were irreconcilable, I
broke Rules, starting at the bottom of the list, until I found a solution.
For the first model, I implemented all of the rules. For the other
three models, I allowed two-state circuits, split states between two cir-
cuits, or both.
Rule 5 is likely the most controversial. 6 6 I ultimately decided to
use this range because even if the White Commission was overly con-
servative in identifying acceptable size ranges, a judge cap of seven-
teen is still useful as a way of building excess capacity into the system.
Historically, very long periods passed between major overhauls of the
federal appellate system.6 7 Thus, planning for such excess capacity
would help newly reformed appellate courts remain healthy for a
longer period of time.
This approach also has the effect of transforming caseload-per-
judge limits into judges-per-circuit limits. Altering the model to fix
the number of judges or directly impose caseload-per-circuit limits
would be simple. Therefore, depending on which variable the user
wants to optimize and what data is available, the programmer can
switch variables for constants and vice versa.
B. Gathering Caseload Data
For the integer program to meaningfully alter circuit boundaries
in response to caseload pressures, the user must input the caseloads
originating from each state or district from which the circuit court
hears appeals. As I discussed previously, the Judicial Conference mea-
sures circuit courts' caseloads by calculating their adjusted case filings
per three-judge panel. However, the Judicial Conference does not
panels. 5 '/3 three-judge panels x 500 adjusted case filings per three-judge panel = 2,833
adjusted case filings.
63 See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 232 (1973).
64 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
65 Cf HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. at 232 ("Fourth is the
principle of marginal interference: excessive interference with present patterns is
undesirable . . . .").
66 Although the explicit decision to resort to circuit rearrangement as a solution of
first resort is also controversial, the focus of this Note is to demonstrate how integer pro-
gramming may be used to develop and evaluate proposals for structural change. Further
integer programming could test the proposals on either side of these debates.
67 See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11, 12.
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publish these figures. Fortunately, I was able to use information in
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, a compilation published
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to approxi-
mate these values.68 For this Note, I used figures from the twelve-
month period preceding September 30, 2008. However, running the
model with figures for different time periods would be as simple as
substituting in a new data table.
Two primary difficulties arise in using information from Judicial
Business to approximate adjusted case filings. First, although Judicial
Business tracks how many appellate cases originated from each district
court, it tracks bankruptcy appeals, agency appeals, pro se cases, and
original proceedings by court of appeals rather than district of origin.
Judicial Business tracks these cases by court of appeals because they
often do not originate at the district court level and because knowing
where each case originated is unnecessary to measure appellate
caseload perjudge. For purposes of the integer programming model,
however, allocating these cases among each circuit's districts is abso-
lutely critical. Otherwise, the model could not consider such cases
when evaluating alternative circuit arrangements. To approximate
district-by-district figures, I assumed that each district generated a por-
tion of the circuit's total cases in each category equal to its portion of
circuit-wide direct appeals from district courts. If district-by-district
data became publicly available in the future, swapping that data into
the program would be simple.
Second, Judicial Business stopped tracking reinstated cases in
2007. Instead, it now tracks a broader category: reopened cases. For-
tunately, reopened cases only constitute a small portion of appellate
cases.6 9 In addition, a cursory analysis of reinstated and reopened
case figures from the past several years reveals that they make up
roughly the same percentage of total cases. Accordingly, I used re-
opened cases as a proxy for reinstated cases. This assumption may
have undercounted the adjusted case filings generated by some states
and districts, with the most drastically affected states and districts be-
ing those currently in circuits that hear the most reopened cases-
68 See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTs: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS]
(providing caseload data for the Courts of Appeals).
69 Cf GAO 2003, supra note 47, at 9 n.9 (noting that reinstated cases constitute a
small portion of appellate cases). In the twelve-month period considered here, the ratio is
determinable by examining reopened cases as a percentage of all cases. Specifically, re-
opened cases comprised 0.43% of all cases in the First Circuit, 7.44% in the Second Cir-
cuit, 1.18% in the Third Circuit, 0.52% in the Fourth Circuit, 5.75% in the Fifth Circuit,
1.67% in the Sixth Circuit, 1.84% in the Seventh Circuit, 0.96% in the Eighth Circuit,
2.86% in the Ninth Circuit, 0.99% in the Tenth Circuit, and 4.54% in the Eleventh Circuit.
I calculated these figures using data available in JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 68, at 84
tbl.B-1.
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specifically those states in the current Second, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 70
ESTIMATED CASELOAD BY DISTuCT & STATE7 1
State/District
Alabama
Middle District
Northern District
Southern District
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Eastern District
Western District
California
Central District
Eastern District
Northern District
Southern District
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Middle District
Northern District
Southern District
Georgia
Middle District
Northern District
Southern District
Guam
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Central District
Northern District
Southern District
Indiana
Northern District
Southern District
Iowa
Northern District
Southern District
Kansas
Kentucky
Eastern District
Western District
Louisiana
Eastern District
Middle District
Western District
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Eastern District
Western District
Minnesota
Mississippi
Northern District
Southern District
Missouri
Eastern District
Western District
Current
Circuit ACF
11 608
11 159
11 273
11 176
9 144
9 915
8 376
8 295
8 82
9 5290
9 2501
9 1133
9 1014
9 645
10 335
2 447
3 168
11 2520
11 1111
11 349
11 1061
11 1312
11 193
11 873
11 248
9 17
9 210
9 184
7 1245
7 244
7 845
7 157
7 475
7 213
7 262
8 328
8 159
8 170
10 266
6 459
6 281
6 178
5 904
5 400
5 151
5 354
1 116
4 388
1 535
6 1174
6 819
6 355
8 299
5 408
5 119
5 289
8 762
8 348
8 415
State/District
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Eastern District
Northern District
Southern District
Western District
North Carolina
Eastern District
Middle District
Western District
North Dakota
Northern Mariana Islands
Ohio
Northern District
Southern District
Oklahoma
Eastern District
Northern District
Western District
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Eastern District
Middle District
Western District
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Eastern District
Middle District
Western District
Texas
Eastern District
Northern District
Southern District
Western District
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Eastern District
Western District
Eastern District
Western District
West Virginia
Northern District
Southern District
Wyoming
70 SeeJUDIcLAL BusINEss, supra note 68, at 84 tbl.B-1.
71 I calculated these figures using the data provided in JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note
68, at 83 tbl.B, 84 tbl.B-1, 102 tbl.B-3A, 129 tbl.B-9.
Current
Circuit ACF
9 352
8 177
9 646
1 115
3 613
10 217
2 4463
2 1239
2 624
2 2191
2 411
4 723
4 277
4 159
4 288
8 53
9 17
6 935
6 523
6 413
10 424
10 95
10 132
10 198
9 464
3 1871
3 922
3 518
3 432
1 383
1 95
4 657
8 84
6 672
6 232
6 195
6 245
5 3573
5 437
5 913
5 1211
5 1013
10 194
2 92
3 108
4 968
4 716
4 253
9 206
9 549
4 335
4 213
4 123
10 71
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Current Circuit Court
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O (6judges)Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Puerto
Rico, Rhode IslandO (13 udges)
Connecicut, New York,
Vermont
O (14 judges)Delaware, Newiersey,
Pennsylvania, Virgin
Islands
O 1'5jstdgeasl (11 jugugMaryland, North 0 linos m n
Carolina, South Carolina, Wisonsin
Virginia, West Virginia (11judgna)
O (17jdg) 0 Arkansas Ia,Louisiana, M issippi, Minnesota, Missouri,
Texas Nehaska,North Dakota,
Soutth DahotaO (16judges)
Kentucky, Michigan, a u
OhioRennetss e r gaita C(11judgns)
tinne, sa, iso,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana. Nevada,
Northern Mariana Islands,
Oregon, Washington
,(12 judges)lColorado Kansas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah,
Wyoming
(12judges)
Alabama, Florida, Georgia
a,
C. Initial Observations and Assumptions
When designing the model, I made a few basic assumptions.
First, I assumed that the District of Hawaii would remain in the same
circuit as the District of the Northern Mariana Islands and the District
of Guam. This assumption should not be controversial; they are all
already in the current Ninth Circuit, and the White Commission fol-
lowed this convention when examining proposals to split that cir-
cuit.72 Second, I followed the White Commission in treating the
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Federal
Circuit as special cases because of their unique caseloads, and there-
fore, I did not allow the model to alter their jurisdictions.73 Third, I
did not count Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Is-
lands, or Puerto Rico as states for purposes of Rule 3, which requires
at least three states per circuit.
72 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
7 See id. at 53 n.112.
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Several results were immediately apparent from my initial work.
Most significantly, California, New York, and Texas each generate
enough cases that even if they were in circuits by themselves, those
circuits still could not comply with both the caseload limit and judge
maximum. 7 4 Additionally, although Florida is not large enough to
single-handedly break both rules, constructing a three-state contigu-
ous circuit containing Florida that complies with both the caseload
and judge restrictions is impossible.7 5 In response to these problems,
I forced the program to assign these states to circuits with as few
judges as possible without violating other restrictions in the program.
In addition, six of the current circuit courts have larger caseloads than
can be accommodated within the caseload and judge limits imposed
by the traditional rules.7 6 Because the program is designed to aggres-
sively force compliance with those rules, it will undoubtedly split those
circuits.
III
MODEL RESULTS
A. Model 1
For my first implementation, I asked the program to reform cir-
cuit boundaries subject to all six rules. Ultimately, it adjusted the
boundaries of every circuit except the Third and Seventh and created
two new circuits. These changes appear driven by the program's need
to shrink or split the circuits where caseloads are already very large.77
In particular, the program created the new Twelfth Circuit because it
needed to place California in a circuit consisting of itself and the two
other smallest states that comply with the geographic-contiguity rule.
It also created the new Thirteenth Circuit to absorb excess states from
the oversized former Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. The pro-
74 California, New York, and Texas respectively generate approximately 5,290 ad-
justed case filings, 4,463 adjusted case filings, and 3,573 adjusted case filings. I calculated
adjusted caseload using the data in JUDICiAL BuSINEss, supra note 68, at 102 tbl.B-3A. How-
ever, to comply with the traditional rules regarding caseload and judgeships, a circuit may
have no more than 2,833 adjusted case filings. See supra note 62; see also Bales, supra note
17, at 385-86 (discussing this "big state" problem in the context of California's dispropor-
tionate influence in the current Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
75 Any circuit containing Florida must contain at least two other states, one of which
must be either Alabama or Georgia due to the geographical continuity rule. Although
Alabama generates fewer cases than Georgia (608 cases compared to 1,312 cases), a circuit
containing only Florida and Alabama would still generate approximately 3,128 adjusted
case filings, which already exceeds the 2,833 adjusted-case-filing limit. See supra tbl.1.
76 These appellate courts are the Second Circuit, with approximately 5,000 adjusted
case filings; the Fourth Circuit, with approximately 3,069 adjusted case filings; the Fifth
Circuit, with approximately 4,883 adjusted case filings; the Sixth Circuit, with approxi-
mately 3,238 adjusted case filings; the Ninth Circuit, with approximately 8,988 adjusted
case filings; and the Eleventh Circuit, with approximately 4,439 adjusted case filings.
77 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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gram's decision to split the Fifth Circuit among three different circuits
appears to result from its need to make the circuits containing Florida
and Texas require as few judges above the Rule 5 limit as possible.
Model 1
0
.0
0 9 J: tgo: t
Massachusetts, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island
0 (29jtdgos)
Maine New Hampshire,
New York, Vermont
O (17judges)lDelawae, Nw ersy,
Pennsylvania, irgin
Islands
(15 jndge.lOMaryland, North
Carolina, Virginia,
West VirginiaO ('25 j-dge,)Coloado, New Mexico,
TelxasO (16jundge)
Kentucky Michigan,Ohio
(13 judges)
Illinois, Indiana,
Wisconsin
0 (17judges) (22j-dg-)Arkansas, Iowa, Alabama Flonda
Louisiana, Minnesta, Mississipp
Missouri, North Dakota,
South Dakota (35 d
A laskaCalifornia, Guam,
0 (17judge.) Hawaii, Northert MariaaArizona, Nevada, Islands
Oregon, Washington
(11 jdgnu)Georgia, Sooth Carolina,
aio, ansas, Montana, Teoumne
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Utah,
Wyoming
B. Model 2
In the second model, I allowed two-state circuits where necessary
either to avoid violating the seventeen-judge limit or to mitigate una-
voidable violations of the seventeen-judge limit. Unsurprisingly, when
the program applied these conditions, it placed California, Florida,
New York, and Texas in two-state circuits. 78 However, allowing two-
state circuits did relatively little to decrease the size of some circuits,
resulting in at best a three-judge reduction in the circuits' size. The
four circuits containing California, Florida, New York, and Texas con-
tinued to require more than seventeen judges each. These two-state
78 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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circuits aside, this model's results closely resemble those of the first
model.
Model 2
0
O
A?
0 (11judges)Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island
0 (28judges)
New York, Vermont
O (16 judges)Delaware NewJersey,
PennsylvaniaO (11 judges)
Maryland, Virginia,
Virgin Islands, WestVisrginia
* (12 judges)Louisiana, Mississippi,
Tennessee
0 (16 judges)Kentucky, Michigan,Ohio
0 Illinos, Indians,
Wisconsin
0 Arkansaslosa,
Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota
(16 judges)Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada,
Northern Mariana
Islands, Oregon,
Wssashington
o4jmdg.)
SArizona. Colorado,
Kansas, Oklahonia, Utah
Wyoming
9,V (19 judge)
WAlabasma, Florida
(33 judges)
Alaska, California
(17 judge)
Georgia, North Carolina,
South CarolinaO(23 judges)
New Mexico, Texas
C. Model 3
In the third model, I allowed states to be split between two cir-
cuits where necessary to avoid violating the seventeen-judge limit or to
mitigate unavoidable violations of the seventeen-judge limit.7 9 In no
instance did I allow the model to split states between three or more
circuits, and I treated these partial states as full states for purposes of
Rule 3. Additionally, I imposed the rule that if a circuit contains mul-
tiple districts from the same state, those districts must be contiguous.
This model produced fewer overly large circuits than did Model
2. Attaining this result, however, required the model to split Califor-
79 The Hruska Commission similarly suggested this technique when it confronted the
otherwise unsolvable problem of how to equitably divide the Ninth Circuit. See HRUSKA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-20, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 238-40 (1973).
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nia, Texas, and New York between two circuits each and also required
a total of four new circuits, one more than was needed for Model 2.
This model finally manages to bring California's caseload under con-
trol. Indeed, California's split leaves the new Second Circuit, contain-
ing the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, as the largest
circuit. In addition, splitting Texas not only allows the model to drop
the Fifth Circuit to eighteen judges, but it also allows it to avoid Model
2's potentially highly disruptive three-way split of the old Fifth Circuit.
It also has the added, serendipitous advantage of avoiding an increase
in the number of circuits on the Gulf Coast.80 On the other hand, this
model does split the West Coast between three circuits, two of which
are dominated by parts of California.81
This model also makes larger and more significant alterations to
circuit boundaries than Models 1 and 2. Those models generally
shifted one or two state blocks, and the largest disruptions occurred in
the South (where the models added an additional circuit) and around
Texas (due to the models' efforts to reduce the number of judges in
the circuit containing that state). Although those models split up the
current Ninth Circuit, the new circuits generally occupy the same ba-
sic territory. By contrast, this model's new Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Circuits dramatically cut into the territory of the current Tenth
Circuit.
80 Cf WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing the impact of circuit boundaries
on federalism in the context of the West Coast).
81 See id.
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Model 3
MainueMasa) chusetts, 1daoMotnOeo,1 GotgigsrhCrln,
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Northern District of New VignaWetirna
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Model 4 exacerbates the problem, also apparent in Model 3, that
some circuits are effectively dominated by a single large state or por-
tion thereof The most egregious examples are the Twelfth and Fif-
teenth Circuits, which are dominated by California.82
Model 4
AD
d
0y
O (14 judges)Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire,
Northern District of
New York, Western
District of New York,
Puerto Rico, VermontO 24 iudges)
Connecticut, Eastern
District of New York,
Southern District of New
York, Rhode Island
O (16judges)Delaware, NesJersey,
Pennsylvania
0 (11 judges) (I judges) coord N 
i
Maryland' Virginia, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 1 judge
West Virginia North Dakota, Oregon, Northern District ofTrout,
O (15 judges) Washington Western Distct ofTeasKansas, Oklahoma, (8 judges) (ISjudges)
Eastern District of Texas, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming Q Eastern District of
Southern District of Texas California, Nortkern
, (19 judges District of california,
K tu , Michigan, (Iahaa florida Goam, Hawaii, Northern
Ohio (20 judges)
(13judges) Alaska, Central District (13judges)
Illinois, Indiana, of California, Southern LouisianaMissisoipi,
Wisconsin Disict of California Tentsee Virgin IsTands
3 j s (17jjudges)
A(1rkanssl a, ioGeorgri North Camhlina,
Minnesota, Missouri, South Carolina
Nehraoka. South Dakota
82 In Model 4, the Twelfth Circuit contains solely Alaska and the Southern and Cen-
tral Districts of California. Of the circuit's approximately 3,290 adjusted case filings, 3,146
(95.6%) originate from California. Similarly, of the approximately 2,390 adjusted case fil-
ings in the Fifteenth Circuit, 2,147 (89.8%) originate from California, while the remainder
originate from Guam, Hawaii, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Cf WHITE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 53 (outlining some potential problems with allowing a single state to dominate a
circuit, particularly a two-state circuit).
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SUMMARY OF CASELOAD BY MODEL AND CIRCUIT
Current Circuits
Circuit judges Caseload
1 6 1243
2 13 5000
3 14 2758
4 15 3069
5 17 4883
6 16 3238
7 11 2165
8 11 2075
9 29 8988
10 12 1524
11 12 4439
Model 1
Circuit judges Caseload
1 9 1460
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
29
17
15
25
16
13
17
17
11
22
35
16
Model 3
Circuit judges Caseload
1 14 2275
2 24 3971
3 16 2652
4 16 2522
5 18 2928
6 16 2568
7 13 2166
8 11 1703
9 11 1755
10 10 1558
11 22 3536
12 22 3533
13 16 2641
14 16 2613
15 18 2987
4786
2760
2414
4145
2568
2166
2806
2780
1668
3536
5677
2641
Circuit
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Model 2
Circuit judges Caseload
1 11 1691
2 28 4555
3 16 2652
4 11 1799
5 12 1984
6 16 2568
7 13 2166
8 13 2079
9 16 2644
10 14 2225
11 19 3128
12 33 5434
13 17 2692
14 23 3790
Model 4
Judges Caseload
14 2275
24 3971
16 2652
11 1691
15 2338
16 2568
13 2166
13 2026
15 2454
8 1180
19 3128
20 3290
17 2692
15 2498
15 2390
13 2092
IV
MODEL LIMITATIONS
Although integer programs are very powerful, they do have limi-
tations. The two limitations that are most directly relevant to this
Note are computational limits and the difficulty of precisely defining
the relationships and relative weights of an integer program's vari-
ables. First, despite advances in computer technology, modern com-
puters could still take years to solve a theoretically proper integer
program.83 Many such models can be simplified or more tightly con-
83 This shortcoming is partly due to the manner in which computerized solvers ap-
proach integer programs. Although many algorithms can solve linear programs relatively
quickly, no algorithm can solve integer programs. Instead, integer-program solvers gener-
ally use two main approaches. The first involves converting (or "relaxing") integer pro-
grams into related linear programs, solving the linear programs, and testing the results.
The second involves systematically trying different combinations of variable values. This
process is, of course, a gross oversimplification, but it does serve to illustrate the general
difficulty involved. See FOURER ET AL, supra note 56, at 448-49.
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structed to shorten the time the computer takes to solve them; other
models cannot. One relatively straightforward way to address this
problem is to reduce the number of possible solutions the model has
to consider by adding constraints to exclude solutions that are known
to be incorrect. However, there is a fine line between a solution that
is "incorrect" and one that is "unexpected but not wrong." This prob-
lem did not arise for these models because they already had to keep
each new circuit in roughly the same location as the old circuit. If,
however, the model was modified to ignore established circuit bound-
aries, these constraints would have to be removed, greatly increasing
the amount of time necessary to obtain solutions.
More significantly, integer programs, like all computer programs,
rarely produce useful results unless they are given precise, complete
instructions. For example, everyone knows that Virginia and West Vir-
ginia are adjacent. The model, however, does not know this fact until
and unless it is told.8 4 This deficiency can cause much more vexing
difficulties, however, when it is necessary to assign relative weights to
different outcomes. Here, everyone knows that in some situations, ad-
ding additional judges to existing courts of appeals is preferable to
allowing the courts to continue operating with very large caseloads,
and relatively large caseloads may likewise be preferable to entirely
new courts of appeals; but there is no general consensus on when
each of these options is appropriate. Indeed, this model dodged this
issue by assuming a limit of five hundred adjusted case filings per
three-judge panel and assuming that circuit realignment is preferable
to assigning too many judges to a court of appeals. This approach,
however, is by no means the only way to address the problem.
These two limitations, acting in concert, have a third important
implication for this model. An integer program usually cannot in-
clude everything relevant to the problem that it is trying to solve.
Properly accounting for all influences in a situation would often re-
quire so many variables and constraints that the program could not
finish its calculations in a reasonable amount of time. Furthermore,
programmers sometimes intentionally omit important influences, per-
haps because they arise infrequently or are too difficult to quantify. If
the simpler version of the program is adequate, the omitted influ-
ences might simply never make it into the program. This program
omits several factors for a combination of these reasons. Most obvi-
84 Indeed, the most difficult part of programming these models was designing and
implementing a series of constraints to check for adjacencies properly. The model incor-
porates these constraints by making use of two lists: "pairs" and "triples." "Pairs" lists each
pair of adjacent states. Similarly, "Triples" lists each set of three states that are all adjacent
to each other. Constraints in the program total interstate adjacencies for each circuit,
adjust this total using the "Triples" list, and then make sure that this number is appropriate
for the number of states in the circuit.
604 [Vol. 96:583
2011] ADAPTING INTEGER PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES
ously, it disregards the negative impact of splitting a single economi-
cally integrated area between different circuits.85 Similarly, the
objective function that these models use is relatively naive. In short,
although the model may be "good enough," it almost certainly is not
the best it can be.
CONCLUSIONS
Regardless of what circuit court criteria one prefers, the models
discussed in this Note were all successful in two key ways. First, each
illustrates a "perfect" circuit map based on the parameters given to it.
Second, by providing concrete examples, the models highlight issues
and approaches not otherwise apparent. Each of these points de-
serves further elaboration.
First, the models' results clearly confirm that the ideal circuit cri-
teria are fundamentally irreconcilable. Even the very significant struc-
tural changes that Model 4 envisions fail to bring all circuit caseloads
down to ideal levels. Ultimately, meeting the seventeen-judge limit
would require, at a minimum, placing the Southern District of New
York in a separate circuit from the Eastern District of New York, as
well as splitting California between three separate circuits.8 6 Neither
of these approaches is likely to be widely accepted.
Although not immediately clear from the models' results, analysis
of the circuit maps and caseload figures reveals eleven states that
under ideal circuit criteria cannot be in the same circuit as one an-
other. These states are Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Texas.87 Many,
but not all, of these states are already in separate circuits. Dealing
with this problem necessitates changes to the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits; these changes require further changes to
neighboring circuits as well. Accordingly, as the models are allowed
to deviate from the ideal criteria, the models split these states between
circuits or place them in two-state circuits.
Integer programming models are only as good as the information
and constraints given to them. When a program returns unexpected,
unusual, or unreasonable results, it forces the programmer to deter-
mine what caused those results and adjust the assumptions (and the
program) accordingly. Through this iterative process, the program-
mer can improve the models over time.
85 See, e.g., WHIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing the downsides of splitting
California between different circuits); Marshall H. Tanick, Split in the Circuits: Breaking Up
the Eighth, 61 BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 2004, at 30 (discussing how combining states with
different legal and cultural climates produces undesirable results).
86 See supra tbl.1. Relevant calculations are on file with the author.
87 Relevant calculations are on file with the author.
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The most novel suggestion to arise from these models' results is
that of creating a new circuit in the South. This new circuit would
relieve the current Eleventh Circuit of the necessity of dealing with
cases from both Georgia and Florida, both of which independently
generate enough cases to dominate a circuit.88
On the other hand, a glaring problem in the models' results is
the lack of explicit standards stating when switching a state from one
circuit to another to reduce caseload pressures is appropriate and
when a circuit split is preferable to jointly reorganizing two or more
circuits. Clearly, such changes impose significant costs. Similarly, the
models do not explicitly consider the legal and administrative disrup-
tions that would be inherent in any changes to the circuits' bounda-
ries. Unfortunately, the literature discussing circuit reorganizations
has not clearly addressed the issue of cost,89 and such considerations
are beyond the scope of this Note. Accordingly, I did not factor cost
into any of the models.
Nevertheless, omitting relative weights for splitting or altering cir-
cuits has clear effects on the models' results. For example, Models 1
and 3 both altered the Eleventh Circuit to contain Mississippi instead
of Georgia because more cases originate in Georgia than Mississippi
and because any circuit containing Florida would have too many
judges.90 Similarly, Model 1 put Maine and New Hampshire in the
Second Circuit and Connecticut in the First because Maine and New
Hampshire collectively generate fewer appellate cases than Connecti-
cut. Intuitively, these assignments seem questionable. However, ab-
sent an explicit statement of when such changes are appropriate, the
models simply cannot adequately consider the problem.
The question becomes more complicated when splitting states
across multiple circuits. This division raises the additional question of
whether splitting a circuit into components containing fewer than
three states is preferable to including at least part of three states if
doing so requires reconfiguring more than one current circuit. This
tradeoff can be seen in the ways that Models 3 and 4 split California
and Texas. However, even though the models did not explicitly con-
sider these subjects, they were nevertheless successful in framing the
questions by highlighting specific circuits and states where the
problems arose.
88 Relevant calculations are on file with the author.
89 See WHITE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-57 (briefly considering circuit realignments
that would involve splitting the current Ninth Circuit as well as slightly altering the ar-
rangement of the current Tenth Circuit). See generally Baker, supra note 6 (summarizing
several studies and proposals).
90 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, none of the models is perfect. All would impose sig-
nificant transition costs on the federal court system, and the models
are simply not set up to consider those costs. However, the models
successfully demonstrate the practical effects of proposed changes to
ideal circuit criteria, highlight potential theoretical and real-world is-
sues that accompany those proposed changes, and help identify new
problems and possibilities.
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